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Abstract 
Despite recent changes in legislation and advances towards an integrated project-
wide approach, health and safety management in the construction industry is still a 
major problem, having a substantial cost to business, society and individuals.  A 
prerequisite to improving the situation and developing an effective management 
strategy is monitoring, providing a detailed understanding of the effectiveness of 
different approaches to intervention.  This paper describes a feasibility study, using 
in-depth interviews with senior managers to explore the quality of accident and 
health data, of nine large, high profile companies from the engineering construction 
sector.  The interview dialogue comprised a series of questions and issues to be 
explored on the organisations accident reporting systems (e.g. what is reported, 
analyses performed, computerisation), unsafe act and near miss auditing (e.g. 
definition, validity), failure type indicators (e.g. auditing, quantification), and safety 
culture indicators (e.g. commitment, health).  Whilst safety was a priority for 
companies, health (i.e. medicals and monitoring systems) had not been given the 
same consideration, especially with regard to subcontracted labour.  This study 
shows that the validity of accident statistics as a measure of safety remains a 
limitation and that there is a requirement for a consistent and integrated approach to 
the measurement of health and safety performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Many publications conclude that construction has more accidents of greater severity 
than any other industrial sector and is responsible for a significant proportion of 
occupational illness (Drever, 1995 and HSC, 1996).  Surveys commissioned by the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) indicate compliance with RIDDOR (HSE, 
1996a) for accident reporting is less than 40% (Drever, 1995) and that there is also 
substantial under-reporting of occupational disease (HSC, 1995a).  Thus, the 
published statistics are the tip of the iceberg.  In addition, it has been argued the 
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health and safety performance of construction in the UK compares poorly with other 
European countries (Davey Smith et al, 1990).  Construction accidents also affect 
project programme and completion dates (CII, 1995).  In a report by the HSE (1993), 
the costs of accidents on one case study construction site were estimated to be 8.5% 
of the project tender price,  although it is not possible to establish how representative 
this site is of the industry. 
 In recent years a concerted effort has been made to improve the construction 
industry’s poor performance on health and safety.  The HSE has identified that a lack 
of effective management action causes 75% of fatal accidents (HSE, 1988).  
Legislation has made explicit reference to the need to manage health and safety risks  
throughout the project (HSC, 1995b).  The profile of health and safety management 
has been raised by the development of project-wide management systems  (Gibb, 
1996a). 
 Unfortunately, Snashall (1990) highlighted that modes of reporting accidents 
vary in construction both between companies and within companies such that the 
interpretation of statistics is not easy.  There is even difficulty in the definition of a 
construction worker (as opposed to any worker in the construction industry e.g. 
office worker).  Reliance of the industry on subcontracted workers exacerbates these 
problems.  Smith (1989) advocated that statistics should be used more often by safety 
managers to aid the identification of causal factors and direct the placement of 
resources.  Hinze and Gambatese (1996) also concluded that clear and complete 
accident data is a requisite to the understanding of the causal factors or common 
trends behind accidents.  However, in practice it is suspected that conclusions are 
rarely drawn from accident statistics which are often just briefly viewed and then 
filed (Kletz, 1990). 
 With regard to health, there is wide agreement that adequate medical 
surveillance is not generally available and that work-related health problems are not 
identified in their early stages.  In a survey of 63 line and senior managers Falconer 
and Hoel (1996) found that there was a clear perception of their role in injury 
prevention, but less clarity of the manager’s role in the prevention of ill health.  
Health itself is a complex issue; long term strategies are required; cost benefits are 
not immediate and are consequently difficult to demonstrate; exposure to health risks 
can be multiple with changes in the nature and level of such; it has a low profile; and 
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there is a lack of health personnel within the construction industry (Dong, 1992).  
Because of the long term, disabling nature of many occupational illnesses, the 
financial burden is often borne by families and the State.  Construction organisations, 
in turn, are affected by compensation claims and higher than necessary insurance 
premiums, as well as risks associated with a work force which may not always be fit 
for the job. 
 Whilst the scale of the health and safety problem in the construction industry is 
known, there is only limited objective evidence regarding causal factors in accidents 
and exposure patterns for illness.  In particular, human factors issues and the 
effectiveness of different approaches to intervention are both poorly understood.  A 
prerequisite to this understanding is thorough monitoring.  Other potential benefits 
from well designed surveillance procedures include a raised profile of health and 
safety within organisations and enabling resources to be targeted most effectively.  
This paper presents the results of a case study investigation, assessing the current 
issues for effective health and safety monitoring in the construction industry. 
 
Research Method 
Expert interviews 
The background to this work is described in Gyi et al (1996) and Gibb and Haslam 
(1996).  A combination of document analysis and semi-structured, focused 
interviews were used to explore the components of company health and safety 
information systems.  The purpose was to establish what accident and health 
information were collected, how it was used and its role in developing prevention 
strategies. 
 
The sample 
Interviewees were experienced managers with a responsibility and interest in health 
and safety.  Although they represent nine large, high profile companies from the 
engineering construction sector (i.e. the construction activities of the process, power 
and energy industries), some of the information obtained reflects their personal 
experiences and knowledge.  Two of the companies were clients and the other seven 
were major contractors in the UK:  Consequently procedures might be expected to be 
the most thorough with this group.  Access to companies was obtained through the 
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European Construction Institute, a pan-European and pan-construction organisation 
comprising clients, designers, contractors and trade associations. 
 
Interview schedule 
The two hour interviews were based on a framework suggested by Reason (1991).  
He identified five possible channels of communication considered to form the safety 
information system of a company.  These are described as follows:- 
Channel 1 :  Accident and incident reporting systems e.g. accident report forms.  
This information is most widely collected but thought to be unimportant for effective 
safety management.  Local problems can be identified, but often there is a 
disappointing absence of trends in any long term analysis.  
Channel 2:  Unsafe act and near miss auditing e.g. near miss reports, observation, 
issues, validity.  This can give detailed information on the nature and variety of 
unsafe acts associated with different tasks, however, measurement is difficult due to 
the large numbers occurring. 
Channel 3:  The precursors of unsafe acts e.g. poor workplace design, inadequate 
training, unsociable hours.  These can cause accidents in conjunction with multiple, 
local unforeseen triggering conditions. 
Channel 4:  Failure type indicators e.g. poor housekeeping, inadequate training, 
ineffective communication and poor procedures.  This information is obtained by 
regular observation, evaluation (and quantification) of system activities and can 
guide safety managers to develop effective and targeted control. 
Channel 5:  Safety culture indicators e.g. safety culture assessments, top level 
commitment to health and safety.  This information is the basis for longer term 
evaluation of a company’s health and safety performance.  
 Reason argued that it is important for managers to take regular samples of these 
proactive safety state indicators, in other words a company’s ‘vital signs’.  Thus, 
interview questions focused on the current practice of the company with regard to 
‘what health and safety data are collected?’ and ‘how?’; their value/usefulness; ease 
of access to the information; analyses performed; whether subcontractors are 
included; and if any causal analysis is carried out.  A classification of causal factors 
was taken from O’Reilly and Olomolaiye (1994) together with a seven point rating 
scale of cultural issues from Reason (1991).  The interview concluded with a series 
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of questions relating to health issues.  The interview schedule comprised a balance of 
‘open’ and ‘closed’ response questions and summary of the questions and issues 
addressed are shown in Table 1.  Copies of any relevant material such as accident 
forms, monthly report forms, policies, etc. were also obtained as evidence to support 
information obtained during the interviews. 
 
Results and discussion 
The interviews were recorded on audiotape and transcribed by the researcher.  
Procedures such as triangulation (multiple sources of data,); peer debriefing (critical 
discussion with peers); and member checking (allowing the sample to respond to the 
interview interpretations) were used to ensure research rigour (Erlandson et al, 
1993). 
Accident and incident reporting systems 
The majority of companies collected and collated data for both their own staff and 
subcontractors on fatalities; over-3-day injuries (over-1-day for some companies) i.e. 
the individual being unable to do their normal work for more that 3 (or 1) days; 
minor injuries (first aid only); and near miss events or equivalent (Table 2).  Sickness 
absence data and the figure for total days of lost time injuries were less consistently 
collated, agreeing with the findings of Falconer and Hoel (1996).  Costing accidents, 
although not routinely performed was highlighted as the way forward to focus senior 
management’s attention on prioritising health and safety.   For example, one 
company involved project managers in a workshop to calculate the costs involved in 
different accident scenarios.  This lead to an appreciation of the financial 
implications of lost time, retraining etc.  The response to the question of how 
indicative different types of data were to the level of safety performance on site is 
shown in Figure 1.  Data which companies reported collecting routinely were ranked 
higher and therefore better indicators of safety performance than data which were 
less consistently collected i.e. costs, lost time and sickness absence.  This possibly 
reflects the respondents limited experience using the latter data. 
 Managers were asked to rate various human, managerial, violation, 
environmental and lifestyle factors as contributory to the causation of accidents in 
the engineering construction industry (Table 3).  The factors of ‘unfamiliarity with 
the demands of the job’, ‘poor supervision’ and ‘no feedback from the system’ were 
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ranked highest by the sample, followed closely by ‘violations of safety rules’.  It is 
encouraging that this group of senior managers (although small in numbers) seemed 
to recognise the importance of latent failures e.g. ‘poor supervision’ and ‘no 
feedback’ as being contributory to accident causation rather than focusing blame on 
the worker.  Indeed, three of the major contractors were beginning to examine in 
depth the root causes of accidents e.g. management failures.  In the recent study by 
Falconer and Hoel (1996),  ‘operator error’ was seen as being the major contributory 
factor to accident causation by their sample of 63 line and senior managers.  Reasons 
for this discrepancy could be that this sample was larger and included line managers 
who were perhaps less experienced to take a global view of accident causation 
factors.  HSE information cited by O’Reilly and Olomolaiye (1994) indicated that for 
fatalities, unsafe systems of work contributed to almost half of deaths occurring from 
1987-1993. 
 The use of statistics was limited.  Frequency and incidence data were routinely 
calculated, but only a minority of respondents (one client and one contractor) used 
any other quantitative statistics, e.g. risk estimates, mean and standard deviation.  All 
companies reported collecting frequency data, but even with this there was potential 
for confusion to occur.  For example, the definition for one company was ‘per 
1,000,000 man-hours’ but was ‘per 100,000 man hours’ for others. 
 All of the companies questioned the validity and usefulness of statistics.  
Examples of reasons for this distrust were:- 
1) Suspicion that figures have been manipulated.  For example, the true frequency 
for a project can be hidden by using figures for the whole company.  One third of 
the sample expressed serious reservations about the use/misuse of statistics and 
were wary of the deliberate manipulation of figures. 
2) Inaccuracies and under-reporting of accidents and near misses.  One company 
reported having a sophisticated computerised, accident data system with 
computers on site and accident pro-formas computerised on the screen, but in 
their experience the safety culture allowed extensive under-reporting rendering 
the information on the data base of little value. 
3) Statistics are only useful to detect trends over long periods.  Other measures of 
safety performance are urgently needed. 
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4) Inconsistencies between sites have the consequence where one site may report 
everything i.e. minor cuts etc. whereas another site may only report serious 
injuries.  Such discrepancies have allowed the situation where safety performance 
(as measured by statistics) could appear worse in companies with a better and 
more ‘open’ safety culture. 
 In addition Kletz (1990) warns against basing safety performance decisions on 
data analyses which are not statistically significant.  Nevertheless, the majority of 
these companies were using data publicly on site, in order to produce league tables of 
safety performance, as part of various ‘safety incentive schemes’ sometimes leading 
to donations to a charity nominated by the best contractor.  At the same time they 
also recognised the dangers that such incentive schemes could have by encouraging 
under-reporting of accidents.  This issue has been discussed further by Gibb (1996b).  
 As part of their evaluation procedure of tendering contractors, eight out of nine 
of the sample companies requested incidence and frequency data on all projects.  
One of the clients did so only on large projects.  However, generally it was deemed 
to be a minor part of the evaluation process, for the reasons above i.e. suspicion of 
validity and usefulness.  All of the sample reported that they had their own 
comprehensive pre-qualification questionnaires and assessment procedures to 
examine the management systems of a company with regard to safety, and these 
were regarded to be more informative.  Information routinely requested as part of 
this assessment included the health and safety policy (weighted heavily on 
management systems),  mechanisms of evaluation, procedures, responsibilities and 
method statements.  Also, evidence of safety performance and curricula vitae (both 
for individual employees and the company i.e. previous contracts) were often 
requested and pertinent questions such as ‘when were you last taken to court?’ were 
asked.  The importance of personal experience, peer-contacts experiences and 
‘keeping your ear to the ground’ etc. was also evident from this sample. 
 
Unsafe act and near miss auditing 
The sample was divided with regard to the measurement and use of the term ‘near 
miss’.  Two companies did not use the term and considered it ambiguous.  For 
example, a cut finger could be determined a near miss because the same event could 
have had more severe consequences e.g. loss of an arm.  Three of the companies 
9 
used the term but admitted that there was gross under-reporting, especially apparent 
on the small/medium, lower profile projects.  Reasons for non-reporting included the 
large disincentive created by the ‘macho culture’; a fear of retribution and 
embarrassment;  not wanting to reflect a poor safety performance; the paperwork; 
lack of trust raising fears of a hidden agenda; and also workers were not used to 
reporting such events.  Another three companies were positive about the use of near 
miss auditing and had made efforts to create a high profile by use of notice boards, 
tool box talks, incentives, safety bulletins and a ‘no blame culture’.  The final 
company (a client), although affirmative about the need for near miss reporting, felt 
that despite encouragement and hard work, a high enough level of reporting of such 
events would take a very long time to become a reality.  This company were 
implementing policies such as those to support a high number of visible safety 
advisors on site and increased training, in order to slowly encourage a positive safety 
culture (a pre-requisite to such changes in behaviour). 
 Less than half of the companies (including both client companies) used 
observation-based methods for unsafe act/near miss auditing (such as used by 
DuPont) and then it was mainly on the larger sites.  In DuPont this involves formal 
observation by supervisors of each employee’s working practices, for 1-2 hours per 
week (Reason, 1991).  It was reinforced by all of the sample that to be effective such 
schemes require trust at all levels, a positive safety culture, considerable resources, 
training, commitment and hard work.  The additional cost to the project was the main 
limiting factor.  However, it was agreed that when such schemes work they were 
very effective at raising safety awareness, giving ‘ownership’ to the workers at risk, 
creating opportunities for discussion and identifying ideas for safer working practice. 
 
Failure type indicators 
All the major contractors and both client companies ‘always’ or ‘often’ carried out 
full safety audits and safety inspections on site, many of which were quantified.  
Client representatives were usually involved in these and two thirds of the sample 
submitted copies of audits to the client as routine.  This is encouraging as many 
studies e.g. Liska et al (1993), Mattila et al (1994) have suggested that top level 
commitment and support is an essential factor in ensuring safety. 
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 The majority of the sample considered that audits were a site/project document 
only, for regular monitoring and ‘action’, but archived following completion of a 
project.  Consequently data were not routinely collated or analysed.  It seems an 
omission that these large quantities of data are not utilised and explored, for example 
in the study by Mattila et al (1994), the level of housekeeping strongly correlated 
with the level of safety performance. 
 
Safety culture indicators 
Poor safety culture is now recognised as a significant factor in safety performance 
(Duff et al, 1994 and Dester and Blockley, 1995).  Rating their own safety culture, 
the majority of these large companies gave safety a high priority.  Terms such as 
‘acknowledgement of the importance of organisational and managerial factors’, 
‘many proactive measures in place’ and ‘top level commitment to improving safety 
culture’ featured in their responses.  However, at the other extreme one company 
admitted ‘keeping just one step ahead of the regulators, but showing some signs of 
concern about the accident trends’.  It was accepted that there was no room for 
complacency and that hard work was still needed at all levels before there was a 
confident, genuine commitment to safety.  In agreement with Dester and Blockley 
(1995), most organisations in the sample appreciated their duty to promote safety 
culture development in smaller companies. 
 
Health 
All of the participating companies had an alcohol and substance abuse policy or a 
draft ready for implementation.  It was agreed that if there was suspicion of such 
behaviour regarding any employee, the worker would be requested to leave the site 
and a disciplinary procedure would commence.  However, only one client and one 
main contractor company carried out post-accident, random and pre-hire screening 
for alcohol; in these cases it was a condition of employment and was thought to be 
accepted by workers.  Others considered that enforcement of such screening would  
be difficult in the UK due to civil rights and industrial relations opposition.  
Consequently the true extent of the alcohol and substance abuse problem is not 
known for the UK construction industry, unlike the situation in the USA where 
screening has extended to include such conditions as HIV and hepatitis. 
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 Seven out of nine of the companies (including both client companies) undertook 
pre-employment medicals for their own employees (mostly white collar workers), 
but only one did so for their subcontractors (usually the operatives).  In the case of 
the latter company, a site pass was not issued without a medical.  With regard to 
ongoing health surveillance, six monitored their own employees, but only two of the 
companies monitored subcontractors and then only on certain large projects where 
there was a nurse on site.  Only one major contractor had the view that because they 
were contracting out the work, it doesn’t mean that they could ignore the 
responsibilities that went with it.  Whilst it is recognised that there is a specific 
requirement for health checks with certain tasks i.e. radiation workers or crane 
operators, generally, there appeared to be no consistent approach to health 
surveillance particularly for subcontracted labour.  This is important because despite 
the often quoted ‘mobility’ and ‘high turnover’ of  subcontracted labour, the work 
force mostly consists of the same group of core workers, that have been in the 
industry for years, rotating between contractors and projects (Brown, 1996). 
 Generally companies admitted that they had concerns about health;  managers 
wanted workers who were passed fit for the job.  Issues raised included resourcing 
occupational health management in the competitive construction environment, the 
numbers of temporary workers, multi-contracted work, and the fear of job loss by 
workers.  The view of the sample seemed to be that impetus was needed from 
elsewhere i.e. legislation, rather than from within the industry.  However, pressure on 
the industry is increasing to consider health issues.  For example Fink (1996) reports 
on the case of Armstrong and others versus British Coal Corporation, where the court 
found that British Coal had failed to investigate the condition of vibration white 
finger in its employees properly.  Its defence for this failure of there being ‘other 
more pressing matters in the coal industry’ at the time was rejected. 
 In addition most operatives were thought to be unaware of their health needs 
such that a voluntary scheme would have limited success.  Any health promotions 
were usually aimed at prevention and not surveillance.  One major contractor 
expressed concerns that if the task design required the use of  Personal and 
Protective Equipment (PPE) there was a problem, as workers often do not like 
wearing it, which could ultimately lead to long term health problems.  Taking the 
example of eye protection; glasses and goggles steam up; visual field is reduced; 
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scaffolders bang their heads; vision quality is reduced especially if their eyesight is 
not already perfect; and the macho culture effects their motivation to wear it.  It is 
important that PPE is fully evaluated for the task using ergonomics principles. 
 The main ill health effects of working in engineering construction were reported 
in the experience of the respondents to be manual handling injuries (backs); 
respiratory disease (asbestosis); musculoskeletal injuries e.g. vibration white finger; 
noise-induced hearing loss and skin problems.  This suggests a good awareness of 
the main health risks for construction workers.  In the literature (Drever, 1995), 
construction workers are listed among the occupational groups with significantly 
raised relative risks (p<0.01) as follows:- 
1) most at risk occupational group for skin disease (relative risk 2.51). 
2) 3rd highest risk group (after coal mining and nursing), for musculoskeletal 
disorders of the back (2.95). 
3) 4th highest risk group for trauma and poisoning (2.96). 
4) 3rd highest risk group for lower respiratory disease (3.61). 
5) 2nd highest risk group (after coal mining), for pneumoconiosis (6.47). 
 In addition it was considered by respondents that there was a general 
deterioration in the physical capacity of workers in their 40’s and 50’s caused by 
hard work under difficult conditions, often away from home.  These managers were 
however generally optimistic that improvements in working conditions that have 
taken place in recent years should result in fewer claims in the future. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The case study approach adopted by this research comprising interviews with health 
and safety experts raises a number of issues for consideration by the construction 
industry.  It should be emphasised that their companies represent large, engineering 
construction organisations where procedures might be expected to be most thorough 
and the situation across the wider construction industry is likely to be worse.  The 
research must be placed in context of this.  Themes for concern raised by the industry 
were apparent from the interviews.  The main conclusions are summarised below:- 
1) Serious under-reporting, particularly of minor injuries and near miss events, 
undermines the validity of accident statistics. 
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2) Although under-reporting undermines the validity of accident statistics, this is 
coupled with a failure to collate and undertake effective analysis of the data that 
are collected.  Furthermore there is little to encourage a high reporting rate for 
accidents because this can work against a company when tendering for contracts. 
3) Accident statistics are an indicator of safety performance but should not be the 
only measure of it.  For example, the extent of safety investment can be an 
indicator of safety performance (Tang et al, 1997), including measures such as 
frequency of safety training courses; number of safety officers on site;  the 
purchase of quality safety equipment; and the attendance and quality of tool box 
talks, and safety meetings. 
4) Commitment and hard work are needed at all levels for a good safety culture; 
there is no room for complacency. 
5) Findings from the sample indicate that little exists in terms of medicals and health 
monitoring.  This should be a major concern for the industry and its employees. 
There also seemed to be limited communication between Occupational Health and 
Health and Safety departments with regard to the role each takes in the 
management of occupational health. 
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Table 1.  Summary of questions and issues discussed during interviews. 
 
 Questions and Issues 
Accident and incident 
reporting systems 
What project data are collected (for employees and 
contract staff)?  Are these data collated centrally?  The 
ease of extracting specifics from the data e.g. by month, 
by age of worker, by injury type?  The validity of data 
with regard to safety performance?  Analyses performed?  
Computerisation? Causal factor analysis?  Causation 
factors? 
Unsafe act and near 
miss auditing 
Definition of the term near miss?  Opinions regarding the 
term?  Ensuring validity?  The ease of extracting specifics 
regarding near miss data e.g. by month, age of worker?  
Observation-based schemes and simulation-based 
schemes to aid identification of near misses? 
Failure type indicators Full safety audits?  Quantification techniques?  Informal 
meetings, safety checks?  Inclusion of contractors?  Client 
involvement?  Use of audit data e.g. collation, quantitative 
analysis. 
Health and safety 
culture indicators 
Rating safety culture?  Alcohol and substance abuse 
procedures and policies?  Alcohol screening (post-
accident, random, pre-hire)?  Pre-employment medicals?  
Health surveillance?  Inclusion of contractors?  Main ill- 
health effects of engineering construction? 
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Table 2.  The accident and incident data routinely collected by the companies. 
 
 
 
 Major contractors (n=7) Clients (n=2) 
Data collected company 
personnel 
subcontracted
personnel 
company 
personnel 
contractor 
personnel 
Fatalities 7 7 2 2 
Over-1 or 3-day injuries 7 6 2 2 
Minor injuries 7 6 2 2 
Non-injury accidents 7 6 2 2 
Near miss events 7 6 2 2 
Sickness absence (general) 6 4 2 1 
Total lost time (days) 6 5 1 1 
Cost of accident (*direct) 4 4 1 1 
Cost of accident (*indirect) 2 2 0 0 
 
direct - e.g. sick pay, damage to equipment/buildings, liability.   
indirect - e.g. training replacement staff, investigation costs, loss of corporate image. 
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Table 3.  Factors considered contributory to the causation of accidents.  The scale 
   is 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very large degree). 
 
 mean rank 
(median) 
The demands of the job are not familiar (e.g. inexperienced 
operators) 
3.78  (4) 
Poor supervision 3.78  (4) 
No feedback from the system (disciplinary procedures re 
violations, safety performance) 
3.67  (4) 
Violations of safety rules 3.56  (3) 
Failure to recognise danger or carelessness on the part of the 
employees, 
3.44  (3) 
Hostile environment (e.g. weather, noise, dust, toxic materials) 3.33  (3) 
Lack of training (e.g. equipment use, hazards) 3.22  (3) 
Time shortage (‘cutting corners’) 3.11  (3) 
Health (e.g. injuries, illness) 2.78  (3) 
Tiredness (after physical effort) 2.78  (3) 
Poor tools/equipment (e.g. difficulties using, old, worn out) 2.56  (3) 
PPE deficiency (not provided, poor quality) 2.56  (3) 
Alcohol abuse (hangovers, over the limit) 2.44  (2) 
Information overload (too many procedures, too complicated, 
difficult to implement) 
2.44  (2) 
Monotony and boredom (due to a dull routine without variation 
in the task) 
2.44  (2) 
Substance abuse (e.g. drugs) 2.11  (2) 
 
Figure 1. Respondents ranking of different data types with regard to providing an 
   indication of site safety performance (1=low, 5=high). 
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